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Veritatis Splendor's avatar

Thanks for this, Seth! I probably won’t follow up, because (as you can imagine) there is an insane amount on my plate. But briefly (or not so briefly):

Even granting that this is a non-natural prodigy, the crucial line is this: “If a Catholic invokes demonic deception to explain an apparently miraculous phenomenon outside Christianity, what principled criterion prevents the same explanation from being applied to apparently miraculous phenomena within Christianity?”

There’s a relevant asymmetry: invocation of God the creator, i.e., the supreme, ultimate, perfect God, creator of all else, as knowable through natural reason (which can include classical theism as opposed to non-dualism and panentheism). We have several central arguments, but none of them reason like so: “Non-natural event happened in connection with a vision or apparition of a non-natural entity with content p or in context of religion r; so, p/r is true.” Instead, the only argument of ours in the vicinity is that God the creator won’t let his name be forged — he won’t let creatures perform genuinely naturalistically inexplicable signs in witness to false revelations that *invoke the name of God the creator* and which aren’t discernible from demonic deceptions. For, as Garrigou-Lagrange explains, “A miracle performed in the name of God the creator in confirmation of some revelation to be accepted by all cannot be false, especially if the wonderworker first announces it. This is so because it stands in contradiction with the infinite goodness, wisdom, and truthfulness of God that he would permit his name to be alleged in order to substitute a false miracle for a true one, and that he would suffer his name to be brought forth in witness to a lie through which men would necessarily and invincibly be led into error.”

Catholic vindicatory miracles invoke God the creator. Prahlad’s putatively non-natural prodigy does not (at least, not if Prahlad’s deity belongs to a system affirming non-dualism or panentheism). The goddess Amba is not the ultimate, upper-case-G, supreme, unlimited, perfect ground of all being that is wholly distinct from the world. So there’s a relevant asymmetry from the get-go: if non-natural signs come to pass for Catholic miracles that (i) invoke God the creator and (ii) are indiscernible from demonic deceptions from the moral or physical circumstances (e.g., a serial liar, adulterer, and fornicator who sacrifices a sheep to a demon), then *God’s signature has been forged*, which is contrary to his goodness and his desire for the truth about his revelations to be accessible. But no such forging occurs in as Prahlad’s putatively non-natural prodigy, as it’s not even a claimed revelation invoking God’s name.

For more on the structure of the reasoning, I recommend checking out these two videos from Muse:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L2sIQLDxeEc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp1ivUSSz2s

Of course, I’m leaving out two big elephants in the room: (i) I certainly don’t grant that the case is non-natural (in fact there’s highly suspicious stuff about the case), though going into that would be excess to requirement. And (ii) the evidence for Prahlad’s ‘encounter’ with Amba is, as far as my current (limited) research indicates, poor. We not only need to establish the non-natural character of the prodigy; the putative message needs to be on solid footing, too, rather than (e.g.) appearing decades after the fact with multiple contradictory accounts thereof. Otherwise the sign fails as a rival putatively vindicatory sign.

Have a blessed day,

Joe

NOTE: This comment was edited and expanded, in part thanks to an excellent correction from another commenter below, and in part due to later reflection.

George M's avatar

This is a really interesting problem. One key distinction up front I think is between being skeptical of miracles per se, and skeptical of what miracles can actually establish.

I get the impression of the myriad of apologetic miracle arguments and articles circling that there is a chain of inferences that often get collapsed at some point in the chain: something remarkable happened —> no natural/scientific explanation is possible —> it was supernatural —> it was caused by God —> the religious interpretation attached to it is correct —> this particular tradition or doctrine is vindicated.

Once “rival” traditions produce comparative phenomenon, as you say, difficulties arise as different evidential standards/special pleading emerges, and the accusation of “demons did yours, not mine” hardly seems a solution. Indeed, if comparable phenomena really do occur across traditions this seems to pressure toward a form of religious pluralism, a further problem arises because traditions make mutually incompatible claims.

So, a safer position seems to me to be ontologically open to the miraculous, extremely rigorous about the evidence, and radically cautious about what miracles actually prove.

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